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Martin Luther King, Jr. Lecture
“SKIN IN THE TAX GAME”: INVISIBLE TAXPAYERS?
INVISIBLE CITIZENS?
MILDRED WIGFALL ROBINSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR Mullane, in extending this invitation to deliver the 2014Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial lecture here at the Villanova
University School of Law, noted that she was seeking someone who could
speak from an economic justice perspective informed by work done in the
area of taxation.
As I seek to respond to her invitation, let me first establish a context.
You will recall that at the time of his assassination in 1968, Dr. King was
campaigning in Memphis, Tennessee on behalf of the city’s striking,
predominantly black sanitation workers.1  In Memphis at that time, more
than one half of all black residents lived below the poverty line.2  Compar-
atively, one in seven white Memphians lived below the poverty line.3  “Four
out of [ten] sanitation workers qualified for welfare, and they received no
medical insurance, workers’ compensation, or overtime pay.”4  The work-
ers wanted improved working conditions, and they wanted to unionize.5
Dr. King had long viewed racial injustice and economic injustice as inextri-
cably intertwined.6  But his proposals for redressing the conditions in
which the sanitation workers lived and worked were, in terms of race,
broadly cast.  They included an economic and social bill of rights promis-
* Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation Professor of Law,
University of Virginia.  I thank Taunya L. Banks for her helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this essay and Alex Nordholm, Class of 2014, for his enthusiastic
and very helpful research assistance.  As always, I thank our librarians for general
research support.  An earlier version of this essay was delivered as the Rev. Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial Lecture at the Villanova University School of
Law on January 27, 2014.  I thank Professor Joy Mullane for extending to me the
invitation to deliver the address.
1. See Memphis 1968: Sanitation Workers’ Strike Spurs Cause of Economic Justice,
APWU MAGAZINE (2005), http://apwumembers.apwu.org/laborhistory/05-1_
memphissanitationworkers/05-1_memphissanitationworkers.htm.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.  Even during his formative years, he viewed economic injustice as the
inseparable twin of racial injustice. See generally Martin Luther King, Jr., “My Pil-
grimage to Nonviolence,” FELLOWSHIP (Sept. 1, 1958), available at http://mlk-kpp01.
stanford.edu/primarydocuments/Vol4/1-Sept-1958_MyPilgrimageToNon-
violence.pdf.
(729)
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ing all citizens the right to a job, adequate education, decent housing, and
a minimum income.7
II. ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND TAX BURDENS: WHY IT MATTERS . . .
There is no hint of direct concern for tax matters in any of this.  In-
deed, Dr. King may have been initially taken aback at the notion that con-
cern for economic justice could extend to the ways in which we in this
country raise revenue in addition to concerns regarding the ways in which
we use those resources.  But the importance of our taxing systems, writ
large, cannot be overstated.  Oliver Wendell Holmes quite likely said it
best: “Taxes are what we pay for civilized society . . . .”8  Given the central-
ity of raising revenues to financing our way of life, I submit that the ways in
which we talk about and implement the tax laws allocating the burdens of
this civilized society are just as important as the ways in which we use those
resources to accord the benefits of living in this civilized society.
In fact, Holmes’s observation is quite powerful.  Let’s think about his
words a bit more. TAXES . . . are what WE pay . . . for CIVILIZED SOCIETY.
These words are carved over the doors of the building housing the Inter-
nal Revenue Service in the nation’s capital.9  During the process of em-
blazoning those words upon that building, for a time the words were
“taxes are what we pay.”  Had only those words remained, we would likely
be having quite a different conversation here today.  But as completed,
Mr. Justice Holmes did not say tax is the price that we pay.  Nor did he say
that taxes are paid only by a few.  “Taxes”—the word is plural.  And we pay.
So let’s think more deeply about this quote.  Just who is “we”; what are
these taxes; and what does this civilized society look like?
III. “SKIN IN THE GAME”
Let me digress for just a moment.  How many of you have heard or
used the phrase “skin in the game?”  To my surprise, while watching the
Golden Globe awards on January 12th (for all of ten minutes), I heard
Matthew McConaughey use the phrase in his acceptance speech upon re-
7. See Letter from SCLC, to the President, Congress, and Supreme Court of
the United States (Feb. 6, 1968), available at http://www.thekingcenter.org/
archive/document/economic-and-social-bill-rights.  Dr. King had earlier shared
this vision on the world stage during his 1964 Nobel Prize acceptance speech. See
Martin Luther King, Jr., Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 1964), available
at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1964/king-accept-
ance_en.html (“I have the audacity to believe that peoples everywhere can have
three meals a day for their bodies, education and culture for their minds, and
dignity, equality and freedom for their spirits.”).
8. Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue,
275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9. See Jay Netherton, A “Higher” Calling for the IRS?, WETHEPEOPLE.ORG (June
19, 2013), http://wethepeoplehq.org/2013/06/19/a-higher-calling-for-the-irs/.
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ceiving the award for his starring role in Dallas Buyers Club.10  Mc-
Conaughey said, “This film . . . was an underdog . . . turned down 86
times. . . . We got the right people together five years ago, stuck to it, put
some skin in the game, and here it is.”11  I assume that as used here, he was
referring to investing capital in the project, deemed to be an important
signal to possible investors.  The message to potential investors: We have
put our money on the line . . . we are committed to this project . . . you
should be too.
“Skin in the game”—I was instantly more attentive.  Not because of
his receipt of the award (well deserved in my view), but because of his use
of the phrase.  In non-political settings, it has been the currency de-
manded of those seeking to influence an outcome in a variety of circum-
stances including business, finance, betting, and war: “Skin in the game”—
some thing that the interested party has at risk.  Though he denies it, War-
ren Buffett was thought to have coined the phrase in the business world.12
No doubt he, like many others, has demanded that ante when it appeared
strategically useful to do so.  Indeed, William Safire, writing in 2006, cited
a 1912 news report in which the phrase was used and suggested that the
concept of, at the very least a skin game, predated that 1912 report by
almost 100 years!13
I had encountered that phrase on a recurring basis in recent political
discourse.  The phrase with its unmistakable message has become a part of
everyday American politics.  It may have first been introduced into politi-
cal jargon by Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) in 2006 as the United States
Senate considered health savings accounts (H.S.A.).  During the Senate
debate on a bill that its sponsors claimed would reduce health insurance
premiums, Senator Coburn argued that “H.S.A.’s [would] give consumers
some ‘skin in the game’ by putting them in charge of health-care dollars.”14
The phrase has been used in both the executive and legislative branches
of government and across party lines.  It has been deployed by then Presi-
dent-elect Barack Obama,15 Representative David Camp (R-MI),16 and
10. Mr. McConaughey has since received the 2014 Oscar award for the Best
Performance by an Actor in a Leading Role for Dallas Buyers Club.
11. 71st Golden Globe Awards (NBC television broadcast Jan. 12, 2014) (empha-
sis added).
12. See William Safire, Skin in the Game, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2006), http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/09/17/magazine/17wwln_safire.html.
13. See id.
14. Id. (quoting Sen. Tom Coburn).
15. See Jennifer Parker, Obama Calls for ‘Grand Bargain’ on Economy: ‘Everybody’s
Going to Have to Give’, ABC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2009, 2:25 PM), http://abcnews.go.
com/blogs/politics/2009/01/obama-calls-for-2/ (noting that President-elect
Obama explained that long-term fix for economy would demand sacrifices from all
Americans, “Everybody’s going to have to give.  Everybody’s going to have some
skin in the game”).
16. See George F. Will, Dave Camp’s Plan: Taxes Made Simple, WASH. POST (Dec.
23, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/
22/AR2010122203771.html (“‘I believe . . . you’ve got to have some responsibility
3
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Senator Mark Warner (D-VA).17  In short, it seems that “skin in the game”
is becoming the price for participation in the political process.  Personal
financial risk—some personal stake—is demanded of all “players.”  The im-
plications are clear: no skin, no play.  If you want to participate in the
conversation, you must bring something to the table.
That these are very high stakes indeed should go without saying.
Broad participation in political debate has long been the aspiration for
American governance.  Limiting political participation on the basis of eco-
nomic participation would certainly undermine that goal and would also
arguably compromise the concept of what it means to be a citizen.  A re-
quired economic ante (or the absence thereof), with its vast potential for
constitutional mischief, should not be the litmus test for political partici-
pation.  In fact, this tactic has actually been previously deployed.  The poll
taxes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, primarily insti-
tuted as part of the Jim Crow laws,18 imposed a tax as a precondition to
exercising the right to vote—precisely the kind of economic ante that
“skin in the game” implicitly requires.  Poll taxes were finally deemed un-
constitutional in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections19 in 1966.  Any
conceptual descendants having a similar effect should meet the same con-
stitutional fate.
Furthermore, the suggestion that a significant percentage of Ameri-
cans do not have “skin in the game” is specious.  The fact of the matter is
that most Americans—indeed, the vast majority of Americans—do have
“skin in the game.”
The requirement for “skin in the game,” in the context of the recent
deficit debate,20 along with the “concern” so widely discussed in the 2012
campaign—that almost 50% of Americans pay no federal income tax21—is
for the government you have.’  People have co-payments under Medicare, and eve-
ryone should have some ‘skin in the game’ under the income tax system.”).
17. See Naftali Bendavid & Damian Paletta, Senate ‘Gang’ Hashes out Deficit Plan,
WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10
001424052748704569404576297221814287188 (“[T]here’s no option but to push
ahead.  A way forward won’t be found ‘unless there’s a grand enough bargain that
everybody feels they’ve got some skin [in] the game’ . . . .”).
18. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 84 (2001)
(noting that poll tax was “esteemed . . . as the most reliable means of curtailing the
franchise . . . .”).
19. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
20. See, e.g., Travis Waldron, Taxing the Poor: The Only Tax Increase Republicans
Support, THINKPROGRESS (July 25, 2011, 2:20 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/econ-
omy/2011/07/25/278175/taxing-the-poor-republicans-support/ (providing
quotes from Sen. Orrin Hatch, Sen. John Cornyn, Sen. Dan Coats, and Rep. Eric
Cantor that working poor need to contribute more to tax revenues).
21. The surreptitiously recorded comment made by then presidential candi-
date Mitt Romney during a 2012 private reception for wealthy donors remains il-
lustrative.  Romney was recorded as he described almost half of Americans as
“people who pay no income tax,” are “dependent upon government,” and “believe
the government has a responsibility to care for them.”  Michael D. Shear &
Michael Barbaro, In Video Clip, Romney Calls 47% ‘Dependent’ and Feeling Entitled,
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but the latest version of the ongoing political “cut-taxes/reduce govern-
mental size” wrangling.  Paul Krugman noted in a New York Times op-ed
that the downsizing argument has at its heart an “effort to . . . bully the
nation into slashing social programs—especially programs that help the
poor.”22  The deficit debate is yet another play on the high political visibil-
ity of the federal income tax as an institution.  Though a year apart, the defi-
cit and 47% comments share a common thread: all are driven by the view
that those Americans who are federal income tax “freeloaders” are not enti-
tled to a political voice.  Rather, these Americans can be shut out of the
conversation regarding governmental imperatives.  Both sets of com-
ments, however, share a fatal flaw: neither look beyond the federal level—
and the federal income tax at that—in assessing the extent to which Amer-
icans across the income spectrum bear the burden of costs of governance
writ large.
An editorial published in the New York Times in the summer of 2011
addressed this myopia.23  The editorial conceded, as it must, that in the
context of that debate, the group from whom skin was demanded was the
47% of Americans who did not pay federal income tax.24  Of critical im-
portance, however, as the New York Times editorial also pointed out, the
absence of liability on the lower end of the socio-economic scale results
from deliberate tax policy.25  A combination of deductions, exemptions,
and credits—along with the progressive structure of the internal revenue
code—ensures that the poorest Americans are shielded entirely from in-
come tax liability.26  Many (though not all) of those earning more than
this minimal amount are advantaged by tax expenditures designed to ac-
cord tax relief to Americans hardest pressed economically.  An important
element of this deliberate policy has been the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), implemented with bipartisan support during the Nixon adminis-
tration and substantially reformed during the Reagan administration.27
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2012, 6:51 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/
09/17/romney-faults-those-dependent-on-government/?_php=true&_type=blogs&
_r=0.
22. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Populist Imperative, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/opinion/krugman-the-populist-
imperative.html.
23. See Editorial, The New Resentment of the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/opinion/the-new-resentment-of-the-poor.
html.
24. Id.
25. See id.  The editorial defines the poor as those families making less than
$40,000 annually, noting that nearly ninety percent of those families paying no
income tax make less than this figure. Id.  The average income for an American
household is, presently, approximately $50,000 annually.
26. See id.  Taxpayers will not be subject to liability until taxable income ex-
ceeds an amount greater than the combination of the standard deduction and the
appropriate number of personal exemptions.
27. See Thomas L. Hungerford & Rebecca Thiess, The Earned Income Tax Credit
and the Child Tax Credit: History, Purpose, Goals, and Effectiveness, ECON. POLICY INST.
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The editorial also correctly notes that the federal income tax is not the
only source of governmental tax liability.28  Exemption of liability for fed-
eral income tax purposes does not necessarily carry with it similar exemp-
tion from other levies either on the federal level or on the state and local
levels.29  In the words of the editorial, “[e]ven if [Americans] earn too
little to qualify for the [federal] income tax, they pay payroll taxes . . .
gasoline excise taxes and state and local taxes.”30
The editorial’s key point bears repeating: Americans who do not pay
federal income taxes pay state and local taxes in addition to any levies to
which they remain subject on the federal level.  A close examination of the
effect of this cumulative liability makes even more powerful the editorial’s
assertion that “a vast majority of Americans have skin in the tax game.”31
The simple fact is that the American system of governance is not uni-
tary but deliberately federalist.  Further, fiscal federalism is inextricably a
feature of this stratified American governance.  As such, government on
each level must identify sources of revenue adequate to defray services pro-
vided and—with the exception of the federal government—must do so
within the confines of a balanced budget.32
In reality, the state and local taxes upon which subnational govern-
ments rely inevitably impose an additional economic burden on less afflu-
ent taxpayers.  Because of either the inherently regressive nature of many
of the levies upon which subnational governments rely or the manner in
which they have been implemented (and sometimes both), less affluent
Americans may well carry more than their “fair share” of the aggregate tax
burden.  That is, they pay more than they may reasonably be expected to
pay in light of their more limited disposable income.  Further, the taxes
paid may have little political salience, thus gaining little traction for af-
fected taxpayers.  In short, these taxpayers may have little or no political
visibility.  Finally, because of the long-term economic effects of decades of
racial discrimination, marked racially demarcated differences in wealth ex-
ist.  Black and brown Americans are demonstrably less affluent (and have
(Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.epi.org/publication/ib370-earned-income-tax-credit-
and-the-child-tax-credit-history-purpose-goals-and-effectiveness/.
28. See Editorial, supra note 23.
29. For an explanation of the impact this can have on taxes paid, see CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND FEDERAL TAXES,
2008 AND 2009 14 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/43373-06-11-HouseholdIncomeandFedTaxes.pdf (“For most
income groups, the 2009 average federal tax rate was the lowest observed in the
1979–2009 period . . . . Payroll tax rates rose steadily for the lowest income group,
offsetting some of the decline in their individual income tax rates.”).
30. Editorial, supra note 23.
31. Id.
32. See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL
BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS (October 2010), available at http://
www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-balanced-budget-requirements-provi-
sions-and.aspx (discussing various state balanced budget requirements).
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less disposable income) than their white counterparts.33  As a result, the
burden of regressive taxes is quite likely borne disproportionately by
Americans of color.
IV. REVENUE SOURCES: AN OVERVIEW
A cursory review of the kinds of levies to which taxpayers are likely to
be subject on each level of government is helpful here.  Recall that govern-
ment on each level must identify sources of revenue adequate to defray
services provided.  Without exception, on each level, in recent years and as
a matter of fiscal necessity, income items for such budgets have been of
mixed source; that is, both major and minor sources of revenue have been
tapped.34  Relatively speaking, income, retail sales, federal government
transfers, and property taxes are major sources of revenue and “everything
else”—including user charges, license fees, and excise taxes—are minor
but increasingly important sources of revenue.35
A. The Federal Government
On the federal level, the individual income tax has been the major
income source and currently accounts for approximately 46% of federal
revenue.36  As has been widely reported, this burden is not borne by all
Americans; approximately 47% of American taxpayers paid no federal in-
come tax at all in 2011.37  A point lost in the heated rhetoric of the deficit
debates and the 2012 presidential campaigns is that the percentage had
not always been that high.  The 2011 percentage reached what was then a
historic high as a result of the great recession of 2008; the historical aver-
age is about 40%.38  More recently, in 2013, approximately 43% of Ameri-
33. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 695.  MONEY INCOME OF FAMILIES—NUM-
BER AND DISTRIBUTION BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2009, http://www.census.
gov/compendia/statab/cats/income_expenditures_poverty_wealth.html (provid-
ing data on family incomes grouped by race and national origin).
34. See CHERYL H. LEE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT FI-
NANCES SUMMARY REPORT 2–4 (Jan. 23, 2013), available at http://www2.census.gov/
govs/state/12statesummaryreport.pdf (discussing various sources of state
revenues).
35. See TAX POLICY CTR., State and Local Tax Policy: How Have the Sources of
Revenue for State and Local Governments Changed over Time, fig. 1 (May 8, 2013),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/state-local/revenues/overtime.
cfm.
36. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, TBL. 2.1,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historicals.
37. See Editorial, supra note 23; see also Chuck Marr & Chye-Ching Huang,
Misconceptions and Realities About Who Pays Taxes, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORI-
TIES (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3505.
38. See Marr & Huang, supra note 37.
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can taxpayers had no liability.39  New estimates project a continually
declining percentage until, by 2024, only about one-third will pay no tax.40
It remains significant that a sizeable minority of Americans will con-
tinue to have no federal income tax liability.  This assumption rests on the
expectation that the present deliberate tax policy will remain in place.
Given that assumption, as is presently the case, quite likely a substantial
percentage of this exempt group will remain the working poor.41  For
these Americans, the combination of the standard deduction and the per-
sonal exemption will lop off the bottom of the income curve.42  Further,
many of the taxpayers who exceed those minimal incomes but remain at
quite low income levels will continue to receive disbursements as appropri-
ate from the federal treasury through the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), making the system a negative income tax to this extent.43  Impor-
tantly, despite its shortcomings, many economists and policy makers re-
gard the EITC as having been highly effective in lifting substantial
numbers of the American working poor out of poverty.44  Additional relief
for earners on the lower end of the income spectrum is provided through
the Child and Dependent Care Credit and the Child Tax Credit (CTC),
which in combination, effectively exempt an additional segment from lia-
bility.45  When these numbers—those advantaged by the EITC and those
advantaged by the Childcare Credits—are increased by the number of
39. See Roberton Williams, And Now for the Movie: Fewer Americans Pay No Federal
Income Tax, TAX POLICY CTR. (Aug. 29, 2013, 11:51 AM), http://taxvox.taxpoli-
cycenter.org/2013/08/29/and-now-for-the-movie.
40. Id.  This projection is predicated upon the expectation that the economy
will continue to improve and, possibly, the expiration of tax cuts.
41. See Marr & Huang, supra note 37 (“Most of the people who pay neither
federal income tax nor payroll taxes are low-income people who are elderly, una-
ble to work due to a serious disability, or students . . . .”).
42. See IRS, Publication 501 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/publica-
tions/p501/ar02.html#en_US_2013_publink1000289305 (showing that standard
deduction is $12,200 for married couple filing jointly and personal exemption is
$3,900, for total non-taxable amount of $20,000 for married couple filing jointly).
43. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, Policy Basics: The Earned Income
Tax Credit (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=2505.  The
EITC subsidizes low-income working families.  It provides a refundable credit
equal to a fixed percentage of earning from the first dollar of earning until the
credit reaches its maximum.  After that point, it is phased out until it disappears
entirely. See I.R.C. § 32 (2012).
44. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 43.  The Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, using Census Bureau data, estimates that in 2012, the
credit “lifted about 6.5 million people out of poverty, including about 3.3 million
children.” Id.
45. See IRS, Ten Things to Know About the Child and Dependent Care Credit (March
7, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Ten-Things-to-Know-About-the-Child-and-De-
pendent-Care-Credit (illustrating tax relief and requirements for Child and De-
pendent Care Credit); see also I.R.C. § 21 (providing tax credit for expenses for
household and dependent care services necessary for gainful employment); I.R.C.
§ 24 (providing for child tax credit).  The CTC is the largest tax code provision
benefiting families with children.
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(most likely elderly) taxpayers, who are in receipt of modest pensions and
Social Security benefits,46 a substantial minority exists.  Finally and inevita-
bly, some segment of potential taxpayers may have no liability in spite of
substantially higher incomes because of the confluence of other tax pref-
erences or because of strategic tax planning.  Included in this final cate-
gory are taxpayers who are advantaged by deductions for mortgage
interest, state and local taxes, charitable contributions, and exclusion for
contributions to pensions, 401(k) plans, and employer-sponsored health
insurance.
In any case, all of those who fall into this group will remain subject to
other federal taxes and levies.  Payroll taxes constitute the next major
source of revenue, generating approximately 35% of federal revenues.47
This category includes social security and Medicare taxes as well as unem-
ployment insurance and federal workers’ pension contributions.48  In
2011, a New York Times editorial noted that “[o]nly 14 percent of house-
holds pay neither income nor payroll taxes . . . .”49  This remains the
case.50  Bringing up the rear insofar as individual taxpayers are concerned
are excise or transactional taxes—proceeds of which comprise approxi-
mately 3% of federal revenues.51  Included here are levies on alcohol, to-
bacco, telephone, ozone-depleting chemicals/products, and
transportation fuels.52
B. State Governments
States’ major income items have been either the retail sales tax,53 or
individual income tax,54 or some combination thereof for a significant
share—about two-thirds—of revenue generated.55  Both of these systems
46. See IRS, Topic 410—Pensions and Annuities (Feb. 27, 2014), http://
www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc410.html.
47. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, Policy Basics: Where Do Federal Tax
Revenues Come From? (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=
3822.
48. See IRS, Understanding Employment Taxes, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/
Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Understanding-Employment-Taxes (last up-
dated June 13, 2014) (providing information on employment taxes).
49. Editorial, supra note 23.
50. See Williams, supra note 39.
51. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 47.
52. See id.
53. See State Sales Taxes, FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS (Jan. 1, 2014), http://
www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/tax_stru.html (providing data on retail sales tax and
states’ income).
54. See State Income Taxes, FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS (Jan. 1, 2014), http://
www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/tax_stru.html [hereinafter State Income Taxes] (provid-
ing data relating to individual income tax and states’ income).
55. See SHEILA O’SULLIVAN ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT
TAX COLLECTIONS SUMMARY REPORT: 2012 2 (Apr. 11 2013), available at http://
www2.census.gov/govs/statetax/2012stcreport.pdf (noting that general sales and
individual income taxes generated 30.5% and 35.3% of state income respectively,
for total of 65.8% of revenue).
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have been subject to intensive review and fiscal tweaking recently as states
have struggled in the wake of the latest economic downturn to accommo-
date falling revenues, sometimes in the face of increasing demand for ser-
vices.56  Retail sales taxes have been particularly volatile as state legislative
bodies seek continuously to offset budget deficits by increasing collections
through this mechanism.57
C. Local Governments
Local governments58 have since the 1930s relied principally upon the
ad valorem property tax for financial support.59  The property tax is, in its
purest form, levied against all real property, residential and business,
within the geographic confines of the taxing district.  This tax has almost
from its inception been unpopular with taxpayers and commentators
alike.60  Its most salient feature is the factor that likely has contributed
most to its lack of popularity; again, in its purest form, it is an annual tax
on wealth as measured by the value of property imposed without regard to
taxpayer liquidity.
D. General Observations
In addition, on both the state and local levels, a variety of transaction-
based targeted taxes, fees, and user charges are in place.61  This hodge-
podge of additional revenue sources has steadily become more diverse and
of greater fiscal importance over the last several decades.  Prominently in-
cluded in this last group of levies are the so-called sin taxes: taxes on alco-
hol, tobacco, and gaming.62
56. See, e.g., Phil Oliff et al., States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (June 27, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=
view&id=711.
57. See Gary C. Cornia & Ray D. Nelson, State Tax Revenue Growth and Volatility,
6 REG’L ECON. DEV. 23, 32 (2010), available at https://research.stlouisfed.org/publica-
tions/red/2010/01/Cornia.pdf (discussing volatility with regard to retail sales tax).
58. Included here are county commissions, city councils, town councils,
school districts, and special government districts having financial independence.
59. See WERNER Z. HIRSCH, THE ECONOMICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
96 (Seymour E. Harris ed., 1970); JAMES A. MAXWELL & J. RICHARD ARONSON, FI-
NANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 135–37 (3d ed. 1977).
60. For example, in 1994, 28% of Americans chose the local property tax as
the worst tax, over the federal income tax, social security tax, state income tax, and
state sales tax. See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CHANG-
ING PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON GOVERNMENTS AND TAXES 1 (1994), available at http://
www.library.unt.edu/gpo/ACIR/Reports/survey/S-23.pdf (highlighting survey in
which 28% of Americans chose local property tax as worst tax); see also HIRSCH,
supra note 59, at 95.
61. See LEE ET AL., supra note 34.
62. The legalization of marijuana may present the next big opportunity for
significant increases in sin tax collections.  Legalization is being viewed by officials
in Colorado as a potential tax bonanza.  Colorado’s most recent budget proposal
estimated that sales of marijuana for recreational use could reach $610 billion in
the next fiscal year.  The proposal projected sales tax collections of $134 million
10
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Importantly, with the exception of potentially progressive taxes on indi-
vidual incomes (and in a few states on estates and gifts),63 on all levels the
additional sources of revenue described—major and minor—are gener-
ated through the use of flat-rates.  Whether imposed annually (e.g., fed-
eral payroll taxes)64 or transactionally (e.g., retail sales taxes), structurally,
the levy is a single fixed rate imposed on a targeted transaction.  As such,
because the same flat rate is imposed over, and over, and over again, re-
gressive effect is unavoidable.  The federal income tax, on the other hand,
is an annually determined progressive tax.65  Those taxpayers who have
more pay more and, consequently, bear a larger share of the costs of gov-
ernment.  A caveat here: state income tax systems may or may not be pro-
gressive.  Progressivity may mirror that of the federal system or may be
muted primarily by virtue of a relatively tight state marginal rate struc-
ture.66  State income tax systems may, in fact, be regressive in effect if the
state relies upon a flat rate to determine liability.
V. WHY CARE ABOUT REGRESSIVE EFFECT?  ORIGIN AND MANAGEMENT
A quick example demonstrates regressive effect.  Again and briefly, to
characterize a tax or system of charges as regressive is to say that the levy
exacts more, relatively speaking, from those having less from which to pay
it.  Assume that we have two individual taxpayers.  Taxpayers A and B are
both domiciled in the State of Bliss.  Both are required to pay 10% of
incomes received during the calendar year to the State of Bliss.  Taxpayer
A has $10,000 in income from which to pay the tax and Taxpayer B has
$45,000.  Taxpayer A’s tax bill of $1,000 imposes a much greater real cost
from such transactions. See Jack Healy, Colorado Expects to Reap Tax Bonanza from
Legal Marijuana Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
02/21/us/colorado-expects-to-reap-tax-bonanza-from-legal-marijuana-sales.html
(explaining potential tax effects of legalization of marijuana).  Whether that out-
come will be realized is, of course, unknowable.  As noted in a recent Washington
Post editorial, “[o]ver time, the tax take from legal pot probably won’t live up to
the hype because producers, distributors and consumers could develop into a pow-
erful lobby opposed to taxation.”  Editorial, Tax Revenue from Legalized Marijuana
May Not Meet Expectations, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/tax-revenue-from-legalized-marijuana-may-not-meet-expectations/
2014/03/05/4b14865e-a2f7-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html.
63. See State Income Taxes, supra note 54.
64. Federal payroll taxes are flat-rate taxes that apply without exemption on
salaries up to (most recently) $106,800.  As a result, these taxes have a very regres-
sive effect.
65. See IRS, 2013 Form 1040 Tax Table & 2013 Form 1040 Tax Computation Work-
sheet (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040tt.pdf (demonstrat-
ing that federal income tax is annually determined progressive tax).
66. See State Individual Income Tax Rates, FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS (Jan. 1, 2014),
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/ind_inc.pdf [hereinafter State Income Tax
Rates] (showing that Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Utah all have single tax bracket, while, Hawaii, for
example, has twelve brackets ranging from 1.4%–11%).
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to A than will be true for Taxpayer B, whose $4,500 liability is higher but
who also has more disposable resources from which to pay the levy.
Regressive effect is not intentional.  Rather, it inevitably results from
the use of any flat rate levy.  As a policy matter, whether and how regres-
sion should or could be managed is a separate and important question.  The
extent to which mitigation can be realized will be driven by several factors.
These include (1) the level of government whose fiscal structure is under
the microscope; (2) its fiscal challenges; (3) the nature of the levy in ques-
tion in conjunction with other revenue sources; and, inevitably, (4) politi-
cal dynamics.  Regression in retail sales taxes, for example, is typically
eased by providing exemptions for designated transactions.67  For exam-
ple, exemptions for the cost of foods purchased for preparation and con-
sumption at home are in place in thirty-one of the forty-five states that
have a retail sales tax.  Of the remaining states, seven tax groceries at lower
rates than other goods, five tax groceries fully but offer credits offsetting
some portion of the cost, and two apply sales tax fully without relief.68
One should not necessarily take tax solace from this well-intentioned relief
provision, however.  As will be shown, relief from regressive effect may
prove illusory because of the happenstance of personal circumstance.
Broadly speaking, political considerations will inevitably come into
play as legislative bodies address fiscal issues including the mix of revenue-
generating systems.  Consider this hypothetical.  State A needs to raise ad-
ditional revenue in order to maintain its spending status quo.  This is not a
matter of providing additional services.  The legislature has three options:
(1) increase income taxes by raising marginal rates—coincidentally realiz-
ing a progressive effect; (2) increase sales taxes by raising the applicable
rate—exacerbating regressivity; or (3) increase the state cigarette tax—
also regressive in effect.  We will assume, reasonably, that all of the legisla-
tors have the best interests of State A in mind but of course included in
that calculus is the importance of retaining their seats!69  Practically, credi-
ble data establish that any of the three possibilities can generate the
needed revenues, but voters—through emails, tweets, and facebook post-
ings—have in no uncertain terms urged the decision-makers to refrain
from manipulating either income or sales tax rates.  Reasons pressed upon
lawmakers by these involved taxpayers are those that you can imagine and
may well have heard: among others, higher income tax rates will cause
67. See generally ANDREEA MILITARU & THOMAS STRATMANN, MERCATUS CTR., A
SURVEY OF SALES TAX EXEMPTIONS IN THE STATES: UNDERSTANDING SALES TAXES AND
SALES TAX EXEMPTIONS (Jan. 7, 2014), available at http://mercatus.org/publica-
tion/survey-sales-tax-exemptions-states-understanding-sales-taxes-and-sales-tax-
exemptions.
68. See State Sales Tax Rates and Food & Drug Exemptions, FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS
(Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/sales.pdf [hereinafter State Sales
Tax Rates] (showing differences in food and drug exemptions among states).
69. See generally WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLA-
TIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES (10th ed. 2000).
12
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affluent voters to exit the state70 and increased sales taxes will place retail-
ers at a competitive disadvantage.71  Ah, but an increase in cigarette
taxes—who cares?  Political action groups composed of smokers or others
interested in resisting an increase in a cigarette tax are rare and, in any
event, may be relatively dispassionate in light of an agenda unrelated to
the tax burden per se.  How much credence, after all, is the tobacco indus-
try now likely to enjoy as a proponent of lower taxes?72  And when last
have you seen a bumper sticker declaring that “I am a smoker and I vote!”?
An increase in a tax on sin often seems the path of least political resis-
tance, hence the proliferation of this category of levies in particular.73  As
a practical matter, many—non-smokers—never expect to be affected by
the levy, and those who will pay are unlikely to seek political sympathy.
Coincidentally, there is one interest group that would strongly support an
increased cigarette tax, but not for reasons of revenue enhancement.
Here we would find anti-smoker coalitions that would, quite rightly, antici-
pate reduced cigarette usage as an ultimate consequence of higher tax
cost.74  Cigarette tax revenues are price sensitive and have, in fact, de-
clined over time after a period of enhanced collections.75
To give this discussion more immediacy, let’s stop for a moment and
examine the Pennsylvania tax structure.  You have a tax on individual in-
comes that uses a flat rate, 3.07%, on incomes.76  By the way, Penn-
sylvania’s reliance on a flat rate makes it one of only eight states utilizing a
flat rate among the forty-five states that tax income.77  (Interestingly, one
of the other seven states is Massachusetts; both of these states are adjacent
to New York.78  There is likely an intriguing story of tax competition be-
70. But see Robert Smith, Studies: Rich Don’t Flee High-Tax States, NPR (Apr. 29,
2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/04/29/135813061/
studies-rich-dont-flee-high-tax-states.
71. See Jeff Bell, Tired of Disadvantage, Retailers Stump for Online Sales Tax, CIN-
CINNATI BUS. COURIER (Oct. 28, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/cin-
cinnati/print-edition/2011/10/28/tired-of-disadvantage-retailers-
stump.html?page=all.
72. See Michael S. Givel & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Lobby Political Influence on
US State Legislatures in the 1990s, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 124 (2001), available at
http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/10/2/124.full.
73. See Katrina Trinko, Opinion, Political Cowards Love the Sin Tax, USA TODAY
(Sept. 20, 2010, 5:13 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/fo-
rum/2010-09-21-column21_ST_N.htm?loc=interstitialskip.
74. See generally Frank J. Chaloupka et al., Tobacco Taxes as a Tobacco Control
Strategy, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 172 (2012), available at http://tobaccocon-
trol.bmj.com/content/21/2/172.full.pdf+html (demonstrating that over 100 stud-
ies have found that tobacco excise taxes are powerful tool for reducing tobacco
use).
75. Id.
76. See State Income Tax Rates, supra note 66.
77. See id.
78. See id.
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tween states here).  Your sales tax rate is 6%79—sixteenth highest in the
country—with exemptions for “not-ready-to-eat” food,80 most wearing ap-
parel, legally available drugs both prescribed and over-the-counter,81 and
some textbooks.82  The sales tax rate is 8% in Philadelphia and 7% in
Allegheny County (Pittsburgh).83  Cigarettes are taxed at the rate of
$1.60/pack—twenty-second highest in the country.84  Your tax on gasoline
has just been increased by $.095/gallon for 2014,85 setting you on course
to have the highest such tax in the country by 2017.86  Finally, I found
particularly interesting the fact that Pennsylvania generates over $1.4 bil-
lion annually from gambling revenues,87 more money from casino gam-
bling than any other state.88  In 2013, over half that amount, $782.5
million, will be used for property tax relief on the local level.89  The prop-
erty tax is the principal source of revenue on the local level (excluding
inter-governmental transfers)90 and is only levied on those who can afford
to own property.91  Thus, Pennsylvania uses levies on gambling revenues,
costs borne overwhelmingly by the poor,92 to alleviate property tax le-
vies—relief that benefits only the class of individuals who own property.
Overall, this is a pretty regressive structure.
79. 61 PA. CODE § 31.2 (1972).  For the proposition that the 6% rate is the
sixteenth highest in the nation, see State Sales Tax Rates, supra note 68.
80. 61 PA. CODE § 60.7(b)(5) (1994); see also State Sales Tax Rates, supra note
68.
81. 61 PA. CODE § 52.1(b) (1990).
82. Id. § 58.9 (1971).
83. See PA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, Sales, Use and Hotel Occupancy Tax, http://www.
portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/sales,_use_hotel_occupancy_tax/
14487 (last visited Aug. 1, 2014).
84. See State Excise Tax Rates on Cigarettes, FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS (Jan. 1, 2014),
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/cigarette.pdf.
85. See 43 Pa. Bull. 7360 (Dec. 14, 2013).
86. See Peter Mucha, Pa. Gas Tax to Rise Jan. 1, Again in 2015 and ‘17, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Dec. 31, 2013, 12:28 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/Pa_gas_
tax_to_rise_Jan_1_again_in_2015_and_17_.html (explaining that by 2017, new tax
rate could add up to 25 cents to each gallon, making Pennsylvania’s gas tax rate
higher than any current gas tax rate in country).
87. Harold Brubaker, Pa. Leads in Casino Tax Revenue, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug.
26, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-08-26/business/41446163_1_casino-tax-
revenue-casino-advocate-gambling.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Roberton Williams & Yuri Shadunsky, State and Local Tax Policy: What
Are the Sources of Revenue for Local Governments?, TAX POLICY CTR. (May 7, 2013),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/state-local/revenues/lo-
cal_revenue.cfm (illustrating sources of local revenue).
91. The property tax, however, is not in itself progressive; it is technically re-
gressive for those upon whom it is levied.
92. See generally Mary O. Borg et al., The Incidence of Taxes on Casino Gambling:
Exploiting the Tired and Poor, 50 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIOLOGY 323 (1991) (discussing
impact of casino taxes on poor).
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I submit that regressive effect should be a policy concern.  Regression
imposes a greater financial burden on those with fewer resources from
which to service the levy.  This nagging question persists: should public
budgets, in the final analysis, be balanced on the backs of those least able
to pay?93
So where are we now in this analysis?  Recall point one: Americans
who do not pay federal income tax nonetheless have “skin in the game;”
they are subject to other federal taxes and levies as well as a wide range of
tax and non-tax levies on the state and local level.  Here I reiterate point
two: In light of the regressive effect of, especially state taxing structures,
less affluent Americans may actually bear more than their fair share of fi-
nancing the burdens of government!
VI. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, RACE, AND REGRESSION
Even more troubling, regression’s socio-economic skew has a racial
component.  This is inevitable in light of present income distributions and
given the long-term economic consequences of racial discrimination.  The
racial component is inevitable because less affluent Americans remain dis-
proportionately black and brown.94  The Great Recession of 2008 has
taken a fearsome toll on Americans generally—almost daily we hear re-
ports of the disappearing middle class.95  Adding to this concern is the
fact that Americans of color, latecomers to the middle class, are losing the
battle to remain there at greater rates.  Unemployment rates for African
Americans have persistently been twice those of non-Hispanic whites.96  As
of January 2014, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for whites was
5.7% (17.5% for sixteen to nineteen year olds); for black or African Amer-
icans, the comparable figures were 12.1% and 38%.97  Hispanic or Latino
Americans suffer rates greater than those of white Americans, though they
have been and remain less hard hit than African Americans.98  Average
household incomes show a similar disparity: As of 2009, white households
93. See generally Martin A. Sullivan, Taxing the Sins of the Poor: Do Two Wrongs
Make a Right?, 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 54-104 (2000) (discussing regressive effect
of cigarette taxes and charges incident to state-run lotteries and suggesting that
cigarette taxes be reduced and government-sponsored lotteries be discontinued).
94. See SUZANNE MACARTNEY ET AL., POVERTY RATES FOR SELECTED DETAILED
RACE AND HISPANIC GROUPS BY STATE AND PLACE: 2007–2011, US CENSUS BUREAU
(Feb. 2013), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr11-17.pdf.
95. See, e.g., Robert Reich, America’s Vanishing Middle Class, SALON.COM (Aug.
31, 2012, 3:34 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/08/31/americas_vanishing_mid-
dle_class; Nelson D. Schwartz, The Middle Class Is Steadily Eroding.  Just Ask the Busi-
ness World., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/business/
the-middle-class-is-steadily-eroding-just-ask-the-business-world.html.
96. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table A-2.  Employment Status of the Civilian
Population by Race, Sex, and Age (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
empsit.t02.htm.
97. Id.
98. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table A-3.  Employment Status of the His-
panic or Latino Population by Sex, and Age (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/
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had an average income of $51,861;99 black households had an average
income of $32,584;100 and Hispanic households had an average income of
$38,039.101  The “wealth gap” between white Americans and Americans of
color is widening.102  In 2011, the average white household had almost
eighteen times as much wealth as the average African American house-
hold and almost fifteen times that of the average Latino household.103
Americans generally are losing ground.  Income inequality is accelerat-
ing—presently the top 1% of Americans hold 42.1% of all financial
wealth;104 the bottom 80% hold only 4.7% of all financial wealth.105  In-
deed, since the onset of 2008’s Great Recession, the number of American
households with no marketable assets has increased from 18.6% to
22.5%.106
How does all of this lead to political invisibility?  Let me provide ex-
amples of the effects of intertwined lower socio-economic status and reli-
ance on regressive revenue generating systems—even with safe harbors
such as exemptions—on potential political leverage.
A. Income Taxes
Flat income tax rates have a regressive effect.  To the extent, however,
that tax relief measures protect those in the lowest income strata from
liability (for example, through the federal EITC, or a state equivalent
thereof), such taxpayers may be viewed as having no basis for complaint of
unfairness.  This is, of course, in spite of the fact that such tax relief can
only be provided to those least able to pay as the result of deliberate tax
policy.  On the other hand, you may be surprised to learn that—of the
forty-one states (including the District of Columbia)107 that tax individual
incomes—only twenty-four in addition to the District of Columbia permit
news.release/empsit.t03.htm (noting seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for
Hispanics, for January 2014, was 8.4% overall).
99. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table 691.  Money Income of Households—Median In-
come by Race and Hispanic Origin, in Current and Constant (2009) Dollars: 1980 to 2009
(2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s06
90.pdf.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. (showing from 2000–2009, median household income for white
households rose by 18.1% while rising just 9.8% for black households and 14.6%
for Hispanic households).
103. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Net Worth and Asset Ownership of Households: 2011
(June 21, 2013), available at http://www.census.gov/people/wealth.
104. G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RULES AMERICA?
(Feb. 2013), http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html.
105. Id.
106. See Edward N. Wolff, The Asset Price Meltdown and the Wealth of the Middle
Class 9 (Soc’y for the Study of Econ. Inequality, Working Paper, 2012), available at
http://appam.confex.com/data/extendedabstract/appam/2012/Paper_2134_ex-
tendedabstract_151_0.pdf.
107. See State Income Tax Rates, supra note 66.
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an earned income tax credit for reporting purposes.108  Further, in four of
those twenty-five taxing jurisdictions, the credit is not refundable.109  That
is, the taxpayer may be relieved from liability but will not receive a check
from the state treasury should liability be negative.  By the way, Penn-
sylvania does not have an EITC in its income tax system at all!110
B. Retail Sales Taxes
Retail sales taxes have a regressive effect, but that effect may be eased
through exemption.  As I have noted, “foods-not-ready-to-eat” are exempt
from sales tax but the exemption does not extend to prepared foods.  To
the extent then that Pennsylvanians purchase and consume prepared
foods, the retail sales tax applies.
This regressive effect remains particularly troubling when one consid-
ers the plight of those who live in fresh-food deserts111 or who for legiti-
mate non-recreational reasons frequently purchase prepared foods.  For
residents in fresh food deserts, because of generally impoverished eco-
nomic circumstances, the rates of participation in non-exempt transac-
tions may actually be higher than comparable rates for their more affluent
counterparts.  Of necessity, they purchase from prepared-food providers
in their neighborhoods.  Result: no exemption.
The second group?  Imagine the person who is trying to manage two
to three part-time jobs in a difficult quest to remain financially solvent.112
This is not an uncommon pattern in this tough economic environment.
The work demands of this arrangement will likely leave little time to
purchase and prepare “foods-not-ready-to-eat.”  Of necessity they, too,
purchase from prepared food providers.  Result: no exemption.  Who
would have thought that a sales tax exemption for “foods-not-ready-to-eat”
would prove particularly advantageous to suburban residents with nine-to-
five jobs who enjoy the convenience of neighborhood supermarkets while
providing relatively less relief, if any, for their less financially fortunate
counterparts?
108. IRS, State and Local Government EITC Programs, http://www.eitc.irs.gov/
EITC-Central/press/overview/stateeitc (last updated June 12, 2014).
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See generally JUDITH BELL ET AL., THE FOOD TRUST, ACCESS TO HEALTHY
FOOD AND WHY IT MATTERS (2013), available at http://thefoodtrust.org/uploads/
media_items/access-to-healthy-food.original.pdf.  Food deserts are census tract lo-
cated in either urban or rural low-income areas having no ready access to fresh,
healthy, and affordable food available through grocery stores or affordable food
retail outlets. See id. at 9–11.  These areas are, instead, served only by fast food
restaurants and convenience stores offering few healthy food options. See id. at 6.
112. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table A-16.  Persons Not in the Labor Force
and Multiple Jobholders by Sex, Not Seasonally Adjusted (Feb. 7, 2014), http://
www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t16.htm (showing that about 5% of workers hold
multiple jobs).
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C. Property Taxes
Property taxes, relied upon on the local level, are widely though not
universally viewed as having a regressive effect.113  Rates of ownership of
taxable property will almost certainly be lower among less affluent per-
sons.  Further, it logically follows that to the extent that the less affluent
are property owners, their properties are likely to have lower market val-
ues.114  Several studies have shown, however, that such property owners
are statistically more likely to have a higher percentage of that value sub-
jected to the property tax levy.115  In other words, assessment ratios for
such properties have been comparatively higher than for similar proper-
ties of greater value.  Hence, comparatively higher property tax burdens
will ensue.
Renters will also likely bear some part of the property tax cost for the
spaces in which they reside.  This cost may be passed through to those
renters from property owners in the form of higher rents.116  They will be
unable, however, to deduct any part of that levy for income tax purposes
should they be so fortunate as to itemize.  Further, as renters they have no
political voice.  Simply put, they are not property owners!
As noted earlier, income, retail sales, and property taxes are all major
sources of governmental revenues.  Because of the regressive structure of
most of these sources, in combination with income and wealth distribu-
113. Opinions differ. Compare George E. Peterson, The Issues of Property Tax
Reform, in PROPERTY TAX REFORM 5 (George E. Peterson ed., 1973) (asserting that
“[t]here is considerable agreement among the authors that the property tax as
administered today, with all the variations of property tax rates that actually occur
among jurisdictions, and with the flaws of assessment, is a regressive tax”), with
HENRY J. AARON, WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY TAX?: A NEW VIEW 38 (1975) (arguing
that property tax is not regressive).  The consensus view is likely best captured in
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 268 (3d ed. 1980) (arguing that property tax is mildly regressive).
114. See George C. Galster et al., Estimating the Costs of Concentrated Poverty to
American Neighborhoods 19 (Nat’l Poverty Ctr. Working Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 06-42, Oct. 2006), available at https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/
cpr/events/cpr_seminar_series/previous_seminars/Galster.pdf (showing that
property values decline substantially when neighborhood poverty rates exceed
20%).
115. See Alan Finder & Richard Levine, Unequal Burden: New York’s Property
Tax; Hodgepodge of Home Valuations Produces Disproportionate Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (July
6, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/06/nyregion/unequal-burden-new-
york-s-property-tax-hodgepodge-home-valuations-produces.html. See generally Lee
Harris, ‘Assessing’ Discrimination: The Influence of Race in Residential Property Tax As-
sessments, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2004) (assessing extent to which levies
upon taxable property may be driven by relatively lower market values).
116. See Mireya Navarro, Among Cuomo’s Proposals, a Tax Break for Renters, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan 9. 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/nyregion/among-
cuomos-proposals-a-tax-break-for-renters.html?_r=0.  Again, the extent to which
this systematically occurs is difficult to determine.  Normatively, rents are likely a
product of supply and demand, and price would be divorced from the costs other-
wise incurred by landlords.  This outcome may be affected, however, when socio-
economic status and race are factored into the equation.
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tions, each source imposes additional costs, relatively speaking, on those
less able to bear those costs.  This economic reality is no less skewed with
regard to excise taxes—sin taxes, in particular.
D. “Sin Taxes”
Consider our current view of smokers.  Thirty years ago, cigarette ads
were ubiquitous on television.117  Iconic images from that bygone period
include the Marlboro Man, whose handsome, rugged demeanor as seen
through a haze of cigarette smoke depicted decisiveness, sophistication,
and poise—all desirable characteristics, to be sure.118  Further, the to-
bacco industry’s marketing effort cut across gender lines.  Television ad-
vertisements for Virginia Slim cigarettes targeted female smokers.  These
ads featured the newly liberated, pert, saucy, and attractive Virginia Slims
girl sashaying into camera view, cigarette in hand, as the jingle over in-
toned: “You’ve come a long way, Baby.  You’ve got your own cigarette now,
Baby.”119  As a society, we now look down upon smokers.120  Our present
smoker’s image is that of the haggard cancer victim in the public service
announcement who struggles to speak in spite of her tracheotomy.  She
implores the viewer not to smoke because smoking can kill you.121
Public attitudes about smoking mirror this shift in media messaging.
For example, in July of 2001, only 39% of adults surveyed in the United
States thought smoking should be “totally illegal” in “all public places”; by
July 2013, that percentage had risen to 55%.122  In addition, a 2012 survey
found that 94% of respondents viewed cigarettes as a problem to soci-
ety.123  Furthermore, the Surgeon General recently released a report
marking the fifty years since the first Surgeon General’s warning about the
harmful effects of smoking, a 978 page compendium railing against the
harmful effects of smoking.124
117. See generally Richard W. Pollay, Exposure of US Youth to Cigarette Television
Advertising in the 1960s, 3 TOBACCO CONTROL 130 (1994).
118. See JULIANN SIVULKA, SOAP, SEX, AND CIGARETTES: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN ADVERTISING 235 (2012).
119. HAL WEINSTEIN, HOW AN AGENCY BUILDS A BRAND—THE VIRGINIA SLIMS
STORY 16 (1969), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/efc64e00/pdf; see
also SIVULKA, supra note 118, at 278.
120. See Omar Shafey et al., The Tobacco Atlas, THE AM. CANCER SOC’Y (3d ed.
2012), http://www.cancer.org/aboutus/globalhealth/cancerandtobaccocontrol
resources/the-tobacco-atlas-3rd-edition.
121. See Anti-Smoking Ads 2012: CDC Offers GRAPHIC Reasons to Quit Smoking,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2012, 4:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/03/19/cdc-anti-smoking-ads-2012_n_1364946.html.
122. Tobacco and Smoking, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1717/to-
bacco-smoking.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
123. Id.
124. See generally OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING—50 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2014), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.
gov/library/reports/50-years-of-progress/full-report.pdf.
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Similarly, gambling is negatively perceived by the public.  It is gener-
ally viewed as a socially harmful activity.125  For example, a 1999 Gallup
survey found that 56% of adults “believed that casinos damage everyday
family and community life.”126  Furthermore, in a recent survey of Iowans,
when asked whether “[g]ambling is dangerous for family life,” 64% of re-
spondents agreed,127 and 51% agreed that “[g]ambling is a harmful form
of entertainment.”128
Finally, those who drink (especially to excess) are regarded with suspi-
cion.129  While alcohol consumption on some level is the norm in the
United States, 86% of Americans believe that alcohol is a problem in soci-
ety.130  The likely targets of that sentiment are heavy drinkers and al-
coholics, who continue to be stigmatized.  For example, a 2011 study
found that, when asked whether a social stigma associated with alcoholism
persisted, 83% of psychiatrists and 70% of doctors asserted there was a
strong stigma.131
Think of what this portends insofar as political visibility is concerned.
How likely is it that successful taxpayer coalitions built upon patterns of
personal tobacco consumption might form and participate in the political
process?  Moreover, with public attitudes generally hostile to gambling’s
effects on society, it is unlikely that gamblers’ views receive much credence
in the political arena.  Finally, with attitudes generally averse to drinking
and drinkers, it is difficult to imagine such individuals organizing
powerfully.  Further complicating this picture, an economic skew clearly
exists with regard to cigarette and gaming taxes.  Numerous studies have
established that sin taxes—especially on tobacco and gaming—are dispro-
portionately borne by those lower on the socio-economic scale.132  Cur-
rently available data suggest that the disparity between the propensity to
smoke for individuals who live below the poverty level and smokers who
live above the poverty level is steadily growing.  In 1995, a person living
below the poverty level was 37% more likely to smoke than a person living
above the poverty level; by 2011, that number had risen to 62%.133  Simi-
125. See GERDA REITH, GAMBLING: WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? 226–27 (2003).
126. Id. at 227.
127. MELVIN E. GONNERMAN, JR. & GENE M. LUTZ, GAMBLING ATTITUDES AND
BEHAVIORS: A 2011 SURVEY OF ADULT IOWANS 43 (2011), available at http://
www.csbs.uni.edu/dept/csbr/pdf/Gambling_Attitudes_Behaviors_Report.pdf.
128. Id.
129. See James W. West, Is There Still a Stigma with Alcoholism?, BETTY FORD CTR.
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.bettyfordcenter.org/treatment/doctors-office/is-
there-still-a-stigma-with-alcoholism.php.
130. See Alcohol and Drinking, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1582/Al-
cohol-Drinking.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
131. See West, supra note 129.
132. See generally Rosemary Hiscock et al., Socioeconomic Status and Smoking: A
Review, 1248 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCIS. 107 (2012).
133. Compare CDC, Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults—United States, 1995,
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (Dec. 26, 1997), http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00050525.htm, with CDC, Current Cigarette Smoking
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larly, several studies have concluded that the implicit gaming tax falls dis-
proportionately on less affluent taxpayers.134  The picture with regard to
alcohol usage and consequent tax incidence is more mixed.  One recent
study reported that while patterns of alcohol use and problem prevalence
varied among ethnic groups, rates of abstention from alcohol use were
generally higher for black and Hispanic men than they were for white
men.  The study concluded that whites and Native Americans have a
greater risk for alcohol use disorders.135  Alcohol dependence, however,
when it occurred, was likely to be more problematic for black and His-
panic men.136  These data, however, provide little insight into tax inci-
dence.  Economists view taxes on alcohol as generally, relatively
underproductive.  Unlike taxes on tobacco products, alcohol taxes have
not been raised in recent decades.  Proponents for increases argue that
were taxes on alcohol raised, given patterns of alcohol consumption, the
vast majority of Americans would be unaffected.  In short, no definitive
conclusions can be drawn with regard to the likely incidence of taxes on
alcohol.
E. One Who Pays a Tax—Any Tax—Is a Taxpayer
I intend no value judgment in sharing with you, in particular, the
facts about the incidence of sin taxes.  The primary question remains: How
much political credence do we presently accord to these taxpayers?  I sus-
pect relatively little.  They are invisible.  Indeed, if, as Jean-Baptiste Colbert
asserted, “[t]he art of taxation consists of so plucking the goose as to ob-
tain the most feathers with the least possible amount of hissing,”137 sin
taxes are near perfect taxes, for they are “easier to collect than income
taxes and less visible than direct taxes.”138  The prevailing sentiment
among lawmakers and their advisors seems to be that, for example, “[n]o
Among Adults—United States, 2011, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT
(Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6144a2.htm.
134. See Thomas A. Garrett, Earmarked Lottery Revenues for Education: A New Test
of Fungibility, 26 J. EDUC. FIN. 219, 237 (2001) (“[L]otteries are generally accepted
as regressive . . . .”); Ross Rubenstein & Benjamin Scafidi, Who Pays and Who Bene-
fits? Examining the Distributional Consequences of the Georgia Lottery for Education, 55
NAT’L TAX J. 223, 236 (2002) (“[T]he vast majority of research has found lotteries
to be a highly regressive method of raising revenue . . . .”).
135. See Karen Chartier & Raul Caetano, Ethnicity and Health Disparities in Alco-
hol Research, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, http://pubs.niaaa.
nih.gov/publications/arh40/152-160.htm (last visited Aug 6., 2014).
136. See Frank H. Galvan & Raul Caetano, Alcohol Use and Related Problems
Among Ethnic Minorities in the United States, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND
ALCOHOLISM, http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh27-1/87-94.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 6, 2014).
137. CHRISTOPHER SNOWDON, ADAM SMITH INST., THE WAGES OF SIN TAXES 5
(2012), available at http://www.adamsmith.org/sites/default/files/research/files/
The%20Wages%20of%20Sin%20Taxes%20CJ%20Snowdon%20ASI_0.pdf (quot-
ing Jean-Baptiste Colbert).
138. Id. at 8.
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one can get mad at you for taxing people who drink too much . . . .”139
Nevertheless, the persons who bear these costs—including the burden of
sin taxes—are taxpayers, and they should be heard.  They should not be
ignored—treated as invisible because they have been relieved of liability
for compelling policy reasons, or because the levies have a dimly appreci-
ated regressive economic effect, or because they are imposed upon behav-
iors that strike some as unseemly.
VII. CONCLUSION
Politicizing the federal tax policy discourse—indeed, tax policy dis-
course in general—with this most disingenuous demand for “skin” errone-
ously and wrongly characterizes a significant percentage of Americans as
free-riders who contribute little or nothing to government finances.  The
characterization distorts fiscal policy debate in several important ways.
First, at its extreme, the putatively unmet demand deprives affected citi-
zens of a political voice on that governmental level, whatever it may hap-
pen to be.  On the federal level, the vast majority of those who fall within
the 47% do so because of deliberate Congressional action.  I suspect that
the vast majority of these Americans would opt for more income, conse-
quent tax liability notwithstanding.  On the national level, taxpayers, al-
ready disproportionately burdened with low visibility taxes or levies
imposed upon behaviors deemed undesirable (i.e., smoking, drinking, or
engaging in gaming activities) on the state and local level, are likely fur-
ther disadvantaged both politically and fiscally on both the state and the
federal level. They become invisible. Second, meaningful tax reform at all
levels could be thwarted or stalled due to an incomplete understanding of
the demands and consequences of fiscal federalism leading—in a worst
case scenario—to further distortions of relative tax burdens. Third, un-
checked increased reliance on low visibility taxes, special taxes, and non-
general sources of revenue (the sin taxes, in particular, given the amounts
of revenue raised by these levies), all of which tend to be regressive, accel-
erates opacity rather than transparency in fiscal practices.  As a practical
matter, our failure to understand how we all pay compromises the effort to
reliably determine the extent to which any “share” could be deemed “fair.”
Too much of the aggregate tax burden is invisible, poorly understood, and
simply unknown.
Americans who do not pay federal income tax have “skin in the tax
game.”  They bear, at least, their fair share of the economic burden of
sustaining government.  Indeed, the argument that they bear more than
their fair share is compelling.  Yet because of the way in which this burden
is borne, these Americans may gain little in the way of political traction in
139. Catherine Rampell, For Cash Strapped States, Sin Is Sure Lucrative, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/weekinreview/
18rampell.html (quoting Peter L. Faber, tax lawyer and partner at McDermott Will
& Emery in New York).
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spite of their financial participation.  In the final analysis, attention to tax
matters has inherent within it elements of both economic justice and ra-
cial justice.  All Americans participate financially in bearing the burdens of
government; as such, all should share in the benefits of government.  Si-
multaneously, if some measure of economic justice is to be achieved, at-
tention must be accorded to the fairness and, as appropriate, remediation
of disparate tax burdens.
Overall, the demand for “skin,” with its dubious link to the realities of
aggregate tax burdens, ignores reality.  It is pernicious and potentially eco-
nomically and racially divisive.  It breeds a disregard for and foments a
failure to accommodate competing interests across the socio-economic
spectrum.  At worst, it leads to essential disenfranchisement—invisibility
for those taxpayers whose tax burdens go unrecognized.  Simply put, all
Americans but for those who are abjectly destitute have “skin in the tax
game.”  Through some mix of the several revenue-generating systems of
whatever description, all have financially invested in this “civilized society.”
Less affluent taxpayers are no less entitled than are their more affluent
counterparts to having questions of allocation of the burdens of govern-
ment at all levels resolved as fairly as possible.  The debate with regard to
tax issues on each level must, as a matter of fairness and economic justice,
acknowledge the revenue burdens concurrently borne on all levels.
In short, attention to economic justice in our revenue systems should
be a matter of national concern.
So I have now talked about the “taxes” paid and the “we” who pay
them.  That leaves the “civilized society.”
I will simply remind you of Dr. King’s vision of the civilized society.
Again, he believed that economic justice must necessarily include an eco-
nomic bill of rights, promising all citizens the right to a job, the right to an
adequate education, and the right to decent housing and a livable income.
I believe that, were he alive today, he would agree that economic justice
must also include attention to achieving a fairer allocation of the burdens
of financing government.
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